American Journal of Political Science (forthcoming).
  [Version of record (DOI) | Preprint (PhilPapers)]

Abstract. Normative political theorists frequently compare hypothetical scenarios for the purpose of identifying reasons to prefer one kind of institution to alternatives. We examine three types of "unfair" comparisons and the reasoning errors associated with each. A theorist makes an obscure comparison when one (or more) of the alternatives under consideration is underspecified; a theorist makes a mismatched comparison when they fail to hold fixed the relevant contextual factors while comparing alternatives; and a theorist makes an irrelevant comparison when they compare alternatives assuming contextual factors that differ in important respects from those they "should" assume given their theoretical aims. We then introduce the notion of a modeling mindset and show how this mindset can help theorists detect and avoid the three types of error. We conclude with a reconstruction of Cohen's (2009) camping trip thought experiment to illustrate the approach.

  Journal of Politics 85, no. 2 (2023): 784–788.
  [Version of record (DOI) | Preprint (PhilPapers)]

Abstract. Eva Erman and Niklas Möller (2022) have recently presented a trenchant critique of my (2015) argument that ideal normative theories are uninformative for certain practical purposes. Their criticisms are largely correct. In this note, I develop the ideas behind my earlier argument in a way that circumvents their critique and explains more clearly why ideal theory is uninformative for certain purposes while leaving open the possibility that it might be informative for other purposes.

  Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 23, no. 2 (2022): 312–319.
  [Version of record (DOI) | Preprint (PhilPapers)]

Abstract. Political theorists study the attributes of desirable social-moral states of affairs. Schaefer (2023) aims to show that "static political theory" of this kind rests on shaky foundations. His argument revolves around an application of an abstruse mathematical theorem — Kakutani's fixed point theorem — to the social-moral domain. We show that Schaefer has misunderstood the implications of this theorem for political theory. Theorists who wish to study the attributes of social-moral states of affairs should carry on, safe in the knowledge that Kakutani's theorem poses no threat to this enterprise.

  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104, no. 3 (2022): 696–716.
  [Version of record (DOI) | Preprint (PhilPapers)]

Abstract. It is tempting to think (1) that we may sometimes have what we call hopelessly utopian duties and yet (2) that “ought” implies “can.” How might we square these apparently conflicting claims? A simple solution is to interpret hopelessly utopian duties as duties to pursue the achievement of manifestly unattainable outcomes (as opposed to duties to achieve the outcomes), thereby promising to vindicate the possibility of such duties in a way that is compatible with “ought” implies “can.” The main challenge for this simple solution is to say what the relevant “duties to pursue” are supposed to involve. We survey several existing candidates and argue that none of them succeeds in delivering on the promise of the simple solution. We then propose a previously untheorized class of duties that we call duties to devote ourselves to achieving an outcome, and argue that such duties provide us with an interpretation of hopelessly utopian duties that is up to the task.

  Philosophy and Public Affairs 49, no. 4 (2021): 323–349.
  [Version of record (DOI) | Preprint (PhilPapers)]

Abstract. Several scholars have recently entertained proposals for "epistocracy," a political regime in which decision-making power is concentrated in the hands of a society's most informed and competent citizens. These proposals rest on the claim that we can expect better political outcomes if we exclude incompetent citizens from participating in political decisions because competent voters are more likely to vote "correctly" than incompetent voters. We develop what we call the objection from selection bias to epistocracy: a procedure that selects voters on the basis of their observed competence—as epistocracy does—will often be "biased" in the sense that competent voters will be, on average, more likely than incompetent voters to possess certain attributes that reduce the probability of voting correctly. Our objection generalizes the "demographic objection" discussed in previous literature, showing that the range of realistic scenarios in which epistocracy is vulnerable to selection bias is substantially broader than previous discussions appreciate. Our discussion also shows that previous discussions have obscured the force of the threat of selection bias. Since we lack reasons to believe that epistocratic proposals can avoid selection bias, we have no reason to seriously entertain epistocracy as a practical proposal.

  Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17, no. 3 (2020): 248–273.
  [Version of record (DOI) | Preprint (PhilPapers)]

Abstract. Contractarians aim to derive moral principles from the dictates of instrumental rationality alone. But it is well-known that contractarian moral theories struggle to identify normative principles that are both uniquely rational and morally compelling. Michael Moehler's recent book, Minimal Morality, seeks to avoid these difficulties by developing a novel "two-level" social contract theory, which restricts the scope of contractarian morality to cases of deep and persistent moral disagreement. Yet Moehler remains ambitious, arguing that a restricted version of Kant's categorical imperative is a uniquely rational principle of conflict resolution. We develop a formal model of Moehler's informal game-theoretic argument, which reconstructs a valid argument for Moehler's conclusion. This model, in turn, enables us to expose how a successful argument for Moehler's contractarian principle rests on assumptions that can only be justified by subtle yet significant departures from the standard conception of rationality. We thus extend our understanding of familiar contractarian difficulties by showing how they arise even if we restrict the scope of contractarian morality to a domain where its application seems both promising and necessary. We show that the problem lies not in contractarians' immodest ambitions but in the modest resources rationality can offer to satisfy them.

  Philosophers' Imprint 20, no. 5 (2020): 1–26.
  [Version of record (www) | Preprint (PhilPapers)]

Abstract. Lipsey and Lancaster's ''general theory of second best'' is widely thought to have significant implications for applied theorizing about the institutions and policies that most effectively implement abstract normative principles. It is also widely thought to have little significance for theorizing about which abstract normative principles we ought to implement. Contrary to this conventional wisdom, I show how the second best theorem can be extended to myriad domains beyond applied normative theorizing, and in particular to more abstract theorizing about the normative principles we should aim to implement. I start by separating the mathematical model used to prove the second best theorem from its familiar economic interpretation. I then develop an alternative normative-theoretic interpretation of the model, which yields a novel second best theorem for idealistic normative theory. My method for developing this interpretation provides a template for developing additional interpretations that can extend the reach of the second best theorem beyond normative theoretical domains. I also show how, within any domain, the implications of the second best theorem are more specific than is typically thought. I conclude with some brief remarks on the value of mathematical models for conceptual exploration.

  Cosmos + Taxis 5, no. 2 (2018): 13–28.
  [Version of record (PDF) | Preprint (PhilPapers)]

Abstract. Debates on the practical relevance of ideal theory revolve around Sen's metaphor of navigating a mountainous landscape. In The Tyranny of the Ideal, Gerald Gaus presents the most thorough articulation of this metaphor to date. His detailed exploration yields new insight on central issues in existing debates, as well as a fruitful medium for exploring important limitations on our ability to map the space of social possibilities. Yet Gaus's heavy reliance on the navigation metaphor obscures questions about the reasoning by which ideal theories are justified. As a result, Gaus fails to notice the ways in which his theory of the Open Society resembles the ideal theories he aims to dismiss. Ironically, Gaus winds up neglecting the ways in which the Open Society might tyrannize our efforts to realize greater justice. (This article is part of a symposium on Gaus's The Tyranny of the Ideal.)

  Economics and Philosophy 33, no. 1 (2017): 91–124.
  [Version of record (DOI) | Preprint (PhilPapers)]

Abstract. This paper develops a novel competition criterion for evaluating institutional schemes. Roughly, this criterion says that one institutional scheme is normatively superior to another to the extent that the former would engender more widespread political competition than the latter. I show that this criterion should be endorsed by both global egalitarians and their statist rivals, as it follows from their common commitment to the moral equality of all persons. I illustrate the normative import of the competition criterion by exploring its potential implications for the scope of egalitarian principles of distributive justice. In particular, I highlight the challenges it raises for global egalitarians' efforts to justify extending the scope of egalitarian justice beyond the state.

  In Political Utopias, edited by Kevin Vallier and Michael Weber (Oxford UP, 2017).
  [Version of record (DOI) | Preprint (PhilPapers)]

Abstract. This chapter develops a "nesting" model of deontic normative principles (i.e., principles that specify moral constraints upon action) as a means to understanding the notion of a "fundamental normative principle". I show that an apparently promising attempt to make sense of this notion such that the "real" or "fundamental" demands of justice upon action are not constrained by social facts is either self-defeating or relatively unappealing. We should treat fundamental normative principles not as specifying fundamental constraints upon action, but as specifying basic criteria for comparatively evaluating and ranking possibilities.

  Philosophical Studies 173, no. 11 (2016): 3037–3060.
  [Version of record (DOI) | Preprint (PhilPapers)]

Abstract. The familiar complaint that some ambitious proposal is infeasible naturally invites the following response: Once upon a time, the abolition of slavery and the enfranchisement of women seemed infeasible, yet these things were actually achieved. Presumably, then, many of those things that seem infeasible in our own time may well be achieved too and, thus, turn out to have been perfectly feasible after all. The Appeal to History, as we call it, is a bad argument. It is not true that if some desirable state of affairs was actually achieved, then it was feasible that it was achieved. "Actual" does not imply "feasible," as we put it. Here is our objection. "Feasible" implies "not counterfactually fluky." But "actual" does not imply "not counterfactually fluky." So, "actual" does not imply "feasible." While something like the Flukiness Objection is sometimes hinted at in the context of the related literature on abilities, it has not been developed in any detail, and both premises are inadequately motivated. We offer a novel articulation of the Flukiness Objection that is both more precise and better motivated. Our conclusions have important implications, not only for the admissible use of history in normative argument, but also by potentially circumscribing the normative claims that are applicable to us.

  Journal of Moral Philosophy 13, no. 5 (2016): 530–552
  [Version of record (DOI) | Preprint (PhilPapers)]

Abstract. Our aim in this article is to identify a criterion to distinguish contexts in which innocent beneficiaries plausibly bear remedial duties to the victims of wrongdoing from those in which they do not. We argue that innocent beneficiaries incur special duties to the victims of wrongdoing (qua beneficiary) if and only if receiving and retaining the benefits sustains wrongful harm. We develop this criterion by identifying and explicating two general modes of sustaining wrongful harm. We also show that our criterion offers a general explanation for why some innocent beneficiaries incur a special duty to the victims of wrongdoing while others do not. On our account, innocently benefiting from wrongdoing per se does not generate duties to the victims of wrongdoing. Rather, beneficiaries acquire such duties because their receipt and retention of the benefits of wrongdoing contribute to the persistence of the wrongful harm suffered by the victim. We conclude by showing that our proposed criterion also illuminates why there can be reasonable disagreement about whether beneficiaries have a duty to victims in some social contexts.

  European Journal of Political Theory 15, no. 3 (2016): 333–352.
  [Version of record (DOI) | Preprint (PhilPapers) | Estlund's reply (DOI) | My rejoinder (PhilPapers)]

Abstract. Do motivational limitations due to human nature constrain the demands of justice? Among those who say no, David Estlund offers perhaps the most compelling argument. In this paper, I show that Estlund's argument rests on an ambiguous analysis of the concept of ability. Further, I argue that the most plausible specification of his analysis yields the conclusion that at least some motivational limitations—"good faith" motivational limitations—constrain the demands of justice. In fact, my argument against Estlund implies something stronger; namely, that the demands of justice are constrained by what people are sufficiently likely to be motivated to do. Thus, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, it is the business of ideal theory—not just nonideal theory—to work with the motivational capacities people are likely enough to have.

  Politics, Philosophy and Economics 15, no. 2 (2016): 132–149.
  [Version of record (DOI) | Preprint (PhilPapers)]

Abstract. Numerous philosophers allege that the "general theory of second best" (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956) poses a challenge to the Target View, which asserts that real world reform efforts should aim to establish arrangements that satisfy the constitutive features of ideally just states of affairs. I demonstrate two claims that are relevant in this context. First, I show that the theory of second best fails to present a compelling challenge to the Target View in general. But, second, the theory of second best requires ideal theorists to undertake certain kinds of causal and comparative analyses that are typically thought to lie outside the remit of conventional ideal theory.

  Economics and Philosophy 31, no. 3 (2015): 447–477.
  [Version of record (DOI) | Preprint (PhilPapers)]

Abstract. I present an analysis of feasibility that generalizes the economic concept of a production possibility frontier and develop a model of the feasibility frontier using the familiar possible worlds technology. I then use the model to show that we cannot reasonably expect that adopting political ideals as long-term reform objectives will guide us toward the realization of morally optimal feasible states of affairs. I conclude by proposing that political philosophers turn their attention to the analysis of actual social failures rather than political ideals.

  Journal of Politics 77, no. 2 (2015): 433–446.
  [Version of record (DOI) | Preprint (PhilPapers) | Online appendix (PDF)]

Abstract. The prevailing wisdom among political philosophers claims that political ideals provide normative guidance for unjust and otherwise nonideal circumstances. This article has two objectives. The first is to develop a model of the logical relationship of moral evaluative considerations to feasibility considerations in the justification of normative political principles. The second is to use this model to demonstrate that political ideals are uninformative for the task of specifying the normative principles we should aim to satisfy amidst unjust or otherwise nonideal circumstances. The argument implies that social scientists have an essential contribution to make to the normative theoretical enterprise.

  Politics, Philosophy and Economics 14, no. 1 (2015): 84–105.
  [Version of record (DOI) | Preprint (PhilPapers) | Online appendix (PDF) | Correction (PDF)]

Abstract. Pogge (2008) and Wenar (2008) have recently argued that we are responsible for the persistence of the so-called 'resource curse'. But their analyses are limited in important ways. I trace these limitations to their undue focus on the ways in which the international rules governing resource transactions undermine government accountability. To overcome the shortcomings of Pogge's and Wenar's analyses, I propose a normative framework organized around the social value of government responsiveness and discuss the implications of adopting this framework for future normative assessment of the resource curse and our relationships to it.

  The Philosophical Quarterly 64, no. 255 (2014): 301–307.
  [Version of record (DOI) | Preprint (PhilPapers)]

Abstract. I discuss Gheaus's (2013) argument against the claim that the requirements of justice are not constrained by feasibility concerns. I show that the general strategy exemplified by this argument is not only dialectically puzzling, but also imposes a heavy cost on theories of justice—puzzling because it simply sidesteps a presupposition of any plausible formulation of the so-called 'feasibility requirement' and costly because it deprives justice of its normative implications for action. I also show that Gheaus's attempt to recover this normative force presupposes an epistemic dimension to the feasibility requirement that most proponents of that requirement would reject.

  Political Research Quarterly 67, no. 4 (2014): 783–794.
  [Version of record (DOI) | Preprint (UC eScholarship) | Supplemental Analysis (PDF) | Replication Packet (ZIP)]

Abstract. Extant theoretical work on the political resource curse implies that dependence on resource revenues should decrease autocracies' likelihood of democratizing but not necessarily affect democracies' chances of survival. Yet most previous empirical studies estimate models that are ill-suited to address this claim. We improve upon previous studies, estimating a dynamic logit model using data from 166 countries, covering the period from 1816 to 2006. We find that an increase in resource dependence decreases an autocracy's likelihood of being democratic over both the short term and long term but has no appreciable effect on democracies' likelihood of persisting.

  Journal of Theoretical Politics 26, no. 2 (2014): 197–221.
  [Version of record (DOI) | Preprint (PhilPapers)]

Abstract. Recent work on the resource curse argues that the effect of resource wealth on development outcomes is a conditional one: resource-dependent countries with low-quality institutions are vulnerable to a resource curse, while resource-dependent countries with high-quality institutions are not. But extant models neglect the ways in which the inflow of resource revenue impacts the institutional environment itself. In this paper, I present a formal model to show that where domestic institutions do not limit state leaders' discretion over policy prior to becoming fiscally reliant on resources, those leaders have little incentive in the wake of resource windfalls to establish institutional mechanisms that limit their discretion. Importantly, this shows that simple calls for domestic institutional reform are unlikely to be effective. Among other things, future prescriptions to mitigate the resource curse must focus on decreasing rulers' fiscal reliance on resources.

  Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16, no. 2 (2013): 325–338.
  [Version of record (DOI) | Preprint (PhilPapers) | Handout (PDF)]

Many political philosophers hold the Feasible Alternatives Principle: justice demands that we implement some reform of international institutions P only if P is feasible and P improves upon the status quo from the standpoint of justice. The Feasible Alternatives Principle implies that any argument for a moral requirement to implement P must incorporate claims whose content pertains to the causal processes that explain the current state of affairs. Yet, philosophers routinely neglect the need to attend to actual causal processes. This undermines their arguments concerning moral requirements to reform international institutions. The upshot is that philosophers' arguments must engage in causal analysis to a greater extent than is typical.

  The Journal of Political Philosophy 20, no. 1 (2012): 45–70
  [Version of record (DOI) | Preprint (PhilPapers)]

Abstract. It is conventional wisdom among political philosophers that ideal principles of justice (i.e., principles that would regulate the constitutions of fully just institutional arrangements) must guide our attempts to design institutions to avert actual injustice. Call this the "ideal guidance approach". I argue that this view is misguided—ideal principles of justice are not appropriate "guiding principles" that actual institutions must aim to realize, even if only approximately. Fortunately, the conventional wisdom is also avoidable. In this paper, I develop an alternative approach to institutional design, which I call "institutional failure analysis". The basic intuition of this approach is that our moral assessment of institutional proposals is most effective when we proceed from a detailed understanding of the causal processes generating problematic social outcomes. Failure analysis takes the primary institutional design task to be obviating or averting institutional failures. Consequently, failure analysis enables theorists to prescribe more effective solutions to actual injustice because its focuses on understanding the injustice, rather than specifying an ideal of justice.

  In Oxford Handbook of Global Justice, edited by Thom Brooks (Oxford UP, 2020).
  [Version of record (DOI) | Preprint (PhilPapers)]

Abstract. In this chapter we explore the options available to egalitarians confronting tradeoffs between domestic and global equality, paying special attention to some of their respective benefits and costs. While there need be no conflict in theory between addressing global inequality (inequalities between people worldwide) and addressing domestic inequality (inequalities between people within a political community), there may be instances in which the feasible mechanisms for reducing global inequality risk aggravating domestic inequality. The burgeoning literature on global justice has tended to overlook the latter type of scenario. Consequently, theorists espousing global egalitarianism have not engaged with cases that are important for evaluating and clarifying the content of their theories.

  In Making Global Institutions Work: Power, Accountability and Change, edited by Kate Brennan (Routledge, 2015).
  [Version of record (DOI)| Preprint (PhilPapers)]

Abstract. How should we specify normative guidelines for our efforts to reform global social and political institutions? According to the conventional wisdom, we can identify morally progressive institutional reforms only if we have a picture of fully just institutions in view. My aim in this paper is twofold. First, I challenge the view that ideal normative principles offer appropriate guidelines for our efforts to identify morally progressive institutional reform strategies. I shall call this view the "ideal guidance approach". Second, I develop an alternative methodological approach to specifying nonideal normative principles, which I call the "failure analysis approach". I contrast these alternatives using examples from the global justice literature.

  The Review of Politics 85, no. 2 (2023): 278–280.
  [Version of record (DOI) | Preprint (PhilPapers)]

  Ethics 127, no. 3 (2017): 813–817.
  [Version of record (DOI) | Preprint (PhilPapers)]

  Under review.
  [Contents and chapters 1 and 2 (draft, PhilPapers) | Chapter summaries (PDF)]

Abstract. Models of ideal societies pervade the history of political thought from ancient times to the present. How can these models contribute to our thinking about political life in our non-ideal world? Not, as many political theorists have hoped, by performing a normative function — by giving us reasons to accept particular political principles for the purpose of regulating our thought and behavior. Even still, idealistic models can sharpen our thinking about politics by performing a conceptual function — by helping us clarify and interpret the concepts we use to describe and evaluate political behavior and institutions. These insights point to a more incisive and judicious approach to political inquiry, in which explanatory and normative modes of thought are tightly intertwined.

Abstract. Social scientists risk drawing invalid inferences from their empirical findings when they neglect the conceptual content (as opposed to the operationalization) of a chosen definition of 'democracy'. With this problem in mind, we argue for the following proposition: if one wishes to conduct empirical research that contributes to an existing conversation about democracy, then one must choose a definition of 'democracy' that picks out the topic of that conversation as opposed to some other (perhaps nearby) topic of conversation. We show that, as a practical matter, one of the most effective methods for preserving ''topic continuity'' is to choose a definition of 'democracy' that concurs with one's intended interlocutors' judgments about how to classify particular regimes, emphasizing the superiority (in this regard) of judgments about stylized hypothetical scenarios as opposed to judgments about the actual regimes researchers observe in their datasets.

Abstract. We all want to change the world for the better. But we face myriad complex questions, which together compose "the problem of social change." Among these is the question of strategic orientation: Should our efforts to achieve social change be systematically oriented toward a long-term ideal? Should we instead focus more narrowly on making piecemeal improvements without any definite long-term target in sight? Or should we perhaps adopt some objective beside these? Existing debates on this question have revealed a basic trade-off: moving toward an ideal may require us to make short-term normative sacrifices, while steady piecemeal improvements may make it more difficult to realize an ideal. Yet conventional philosophical methods are too speculative to provide determinate insight on the magnitude and practical significance of these trade-offs. We introduce an analytical framework for structuring thought experiments that can provide traction on these issues. To provide an intuitive proof-of-concept for our framework, we present two basic implementations, which provide some baseline insights and motivate further research. We conclude with suggestions for extending our framework in directions that, taken together, can yield insights that we can use to guide our choice of orientation.